Research on behavioral economics has established the importance of factors such as reference dependent preferences, hyperbolic dicsounting, and the value placed on non-financial rewards. To date, these insights have had little impact on the way the educational system operates. Through a series of field experiments involving thousands of primary and secondary school students, we demonstrate the power of behavioral economics to influence educational performance. Several insights emerge. First, we find substantial incentive effects from both financial and non-financial incentives on test scores. Second, we find that non-financial incentives are considerably more costeffective than financial incentives for younger students, but were not effective with older students. Third, and perhaps most importantly, consistent with hyperbolic discounting, all motivating power of the incentives vanishes when rewards are handed out with a delay. Since the rewards to educational investment virtually always come with a delay, our results suggest that the current set of incentives may lead to underinvestment. Fourth, in stark contrast to previous laboratory experiments, we do not see an increased response of effort when rewards are framed as losses. Our findings imply that in the absence of immediate incentives, many students put forth low effort
on standardized tests, which may create biases in measures of student ability, teacher value added, school quality, and achievement gaps.
Introduction
Behavioral economics has now gone beyond mere academic curiosity, touching nearly every field in economics. Theorists are recognizing behavioral regularities that lie outside of the standard paradigm in their models, empiricists are taking new behavioral predictions to the lab and field, and policymakers are increasingly recognizing the power of psychology when crafting new legislation. One area where behavioral economics has made only limited inroads, however, is in education circles. This is puzzling since it is an area where the insights gained from behavioral economics might be especially great. In this study, we use a series of field experiments to explore how behavioral economics can be leveraged to better understand a key question in education: given the large and increasing returns to schooling, why is achievement among many students so low? Are some students making optimization "mistakes" that lead to underinvestment in education?
A key feature of the education investment function is that in order to experience the long run returns to schooling, students must make sustained investments in human capital that require exerting effort on tasks that often have relatively low returns in the near term -such as paying attention in class, completing a daily assignment or focusing on a low stakes test. This structure motivates several of the central hypotheses about why students might underinvest in education, particularly those in low-income families and low achieving schools.
1 First, these students may undervalue the returns to education (e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin 1999) . Second, they may have high discount rates (e.g., Oreopoulos 2007) . Third, students may not fully understand the education production function (e.g., Fryer 2011a).
2 As we discuss in further detail below, we examine each of these potential sources of underinvestment using incentive designs motivated by insights from behavioral economics.
Previous research has focused on increasing students' estimates of the financial returns to education through both information (e.g., Nguyen 2008 , Jensen 2010 ) and offers of performance-based financial incentives.
3 Even with more accurate estimates, however, students may continue to undervalue these returns due to limited experience with educational rewards or limited understanding of monetary value.
To address undervaluation of returns, we draw on two areas of behavioral economics:
loss aversion and non-monetary rewards. A large literature demonstrates that some people exhibit reference-dependent preferences wherein they respond to losses more strongly than gains (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1991) . Particularly for students with limited exposure to educational returns, endowing them with a performance-based reward in advance of the incentivized task may increase their utility of keeping the reward and motivate greater effort.
We also build on a growing area of research demonstrating the motivational power of nonfinancial rewards (e.g., Kosfeld and Neckermann 2011). These could be especially powerful among younger children who have limited experience with money (e.g., Webley 2005) .
A second driver of underinvestment may be individual time preferences. Numerous studies find that children and adolescents tend to exhibit high discount rates and have difficulty planning for the future (e.g., Gruber 2001 , Bettinger and Slonim 2007 , Steinberg et al. 2009 ).
Again, we draw on an insight from behavioral economics that some people have hyperbolic time preferences, overweighting the present so much that future rewards are largely ignored (se.g., Strotz 1955 , Laibson 1997 . Such preferences can lead to underinvestment when (as in education) the returns to achievement are largely delayed. 3 Recent incentive programs have conditioned monetary rewards on a variety of measures including school enrollment, attendance, behavior, grades, test performance, and matriculation. Examples include Progresa in Mexico which offered incentives for school enrollment and attendance (Schultz 2004 , Behrman et al. 2005 . A similar conditional cash transfer program was instituted in Colombia (Barrera-Osorio et al. 2008 ). Other programs have based rewards on overall school performance (see Angrist et al. 2006 , Levitt et al. 2010 , Leuven et al. 2010 , Fryer 2011a .
4 Previous studies find a negative correlation between hyperbolic discount rates and educational outcomes Previous research has reduced the delay in educational returns by offering financial incentives to students that are paid at the end of a month or school term. Typically, these incentive programs have remained in place for an extended period of time (e.g. a school year) with the goal of affecting student behavior over the duration of that time horizon. However, if students are sufficiently myopic, they will respond more strongly to rewards with very short time horizons compared to incentives extending over several months or years. We therefore compare rewards offered immediately after the incentivized task to rewards offered with a small delay (of one month).
Finally, students may have a limited understanding of the education production function.
That is, they do not know what types of effort will increase achievement (e.g., Fryer 2011a).
If this is the case, then students may not improve in response to performance-based incentives even if they are motivated to do so. 5 We design a clean test of this hypothesis by offering students a reward for performance that is announced immediately before the incentivized task (with no advance notice). This allows us to isolate the role of effort in the production function -avoiding confounding due to discount rates, opportunity costs, planning failures or human capital accumulation (e.g., studying for the test). We also vary the size of the reward in order to separate lack of ability from lack of motivation to exert productive effort in response to incentives.
We test our incentive designs using field experiments conducted over multiple sites and years. This permits a glimpse of behavior not only within the experimental period but for months afterwards. Our field experiments include over 6,000 elementary and high school students in three school districts in and around Chicago. The typical study reports findings from a single experiment without any replications to examine transferability to different settings and scales. This paper addresses both questions by studying the impact of various incentive designs in several settings, among a wide age range of students and in school (Kirby et al. 2002 , Kirby et al. 2005 . Similarly, Mischel et al. (1989) find that measures of ability to delay gratification in early childhood are predictive of longer-term academic achievement. 5 Or, there may be a great deal of uncertainty in the production function, which will lead to the same outcome (see Fryer 2011a for further discussion).
districts of very different size.
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In our baseline setup, students are offered cash or non-pecuniary rewards for an improvement in test scores. The tests last between 15 -60 minutes, yielding a high hourly wage (particularly in the highest financial incentive group) that is likely quite salient among our subject pool of low-income children and adolescents. We investigate the effectiveness of low and high financial incentives ($10, $20) and compare these to the impact of non-monetary rewards in the form of a trophy for achievement. These incentives are presented in either the gain or the loss domain, and are offered either immediately after the test or with a delay (a month after the test).
We find that incentives substantially affect student performance. Both financial and nonfinancial incentives have a significant impact on performance improving test scores by about a tenth of a standard deviation. These effect sizes are comparable to those achieved through a one standard deviation increase in teacher quality (e.g., Rockoff 2004 , Rivken et al. 2005 ) or a one-third reduction in class size (Krueger 1999) . We find mixed evidence on the effectiveness of our behavioral interventions. Framing incentives as losses does not systematically alter the response to the rewards. However, we do find evidence that non-financial incentives can be effective among students who undervalue monetary returns. Younger children are insensitive to the size of the monetary rewards we offer, suggesting limited understanding of these returns; at the same time, they are highly responsive to non-financial rewards, making them particularly cost effective among this group of students. We also find evidence that students have very high discount rates: in contrast to immediate incentives, non-immediate incentives (rewarded a month after the test) have no effect. Finally, students are responsive to high powered incentives but not to low powered incentives, suggesting that they understand the education production function for this task but require sufficient motivation to exert effort.
The design also allows us to uncover some of the underlying heterogeneities that drive 6 In a similar vein, Braun et al. (2011) test a single performance pay incentive among 2,600 students in 59 schools and seven states. Fryer (2011) reports on a series of financial incentive programs carried out in a number of large American school districts (but does not compare different incentive designs within a single setting).
the overall effectiveness of reward schemes: younger children are more responsive than older children; effects are somewhat stronger among boys than girls; and overall, the incentives work substantially better on math than on reading tests. Contrary to a widespread concern, we do not find that incentives have a detrimental effect on performance in subsequent tests.
Our results suggest that in the absence of immediate incentives, many students put forth low effort on the standardized tests that we study. These findings have important implications for policymakers because standardized assessment tests are often high-stakes for teachers and principals (e.g., as determinants of school resources), but low-stakes for the individual students choosing to exert effort on the test.
Relatively lower baseline effort among certain groups of students can create important biases in measures of student ability, teacher value added, school quality, and achievement gaps.
7 For example, the impact of incentives on the performance of the low income minority students in our study would reduce the black-white test score gap by about 20-25 percent (Fryer 2011b) . Understanding the extent to which test score gaps are due to lower effort rather than lower ability is crucial for the design of effective educational interventions: the former requires an intervention that increases student motivation, the latter requires an intervention that improves student knowledge and skills.
In addition, the diagnostic tests in our experiments are similar in nature to many of the low-stakes tasks students must engage in daily in order to accumulate human capital. If delays in rewards reduce student effort in our context, it would seem likely that the typical pattern of delayed rewards in the educational setting (e.g., increased earnings associated with school attainment accrue only with lags of years or even decades) induces sub-optimal effort in general.
7 Baumert and Demmrich (2001) and Braun et al. (2011) make a similar argument based on their findings and review the literature on achievement gaps due to differential motivation. In a similar vein, Jacob (2005) uncovers evidence that differential effort on the part of students can explain the otherwise puzzling divergence over time in the performance of students in the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) on high-stakes versus lowstakes tests. It appears that CPS teachers and administrators became increasingly successful over a period of years at convincing students to take the high-stakes test seriously, but that same effort did not spill over to the low stakes state-administered tests.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the previous work that motivates our incentive design. Section III describes the experimental design and implementation. Section IV discusses the main results and potential sources of heterogeneity.
Section V concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of the findings.
A Motivating Framework
In part to address the potential sources of underinvestment discussed above -undervaluation of returns, high discount rates and limited understanding of the production function -there has been growing interest from educators and policymakers in the use of performance-based incentives. While the results of previous programs have varied across settings, incentives have generally been associated with modest positive improvements in student performance. Our aim is to strengthen the impact of performance-based incentives by incorporating insights from behavioral economics into the incentive design.
Although the incentive structure and performance measures of previous programs have varied, they tend to share the following features. First, they offer rewards as gains. That is, students can only receive and experience the reward after exerting effort and meeting the performance criteria. Second, they primarily employ monetary rewards. Third, the incentives are typically announced well in advance of the incentivized task with a delay between the time students must exert effort and the time they receive rewards.
We build on a large literature demonstrating behavioral anomalies, such as the endowment effect (Thaler 1980) , status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) , and observed divergences of willingness to pay and willingness to accept measures of value (Hanemann 1991) . These examples of reference-dependent decision making are broadly consistent with a notion of loss aversion, an insight gained from Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory. If a student is loss averse in our context, then the negative utility she receives from a loss of x is greater in magnitude than the positive utility she receives from a gain of x (for any positive x). And thus optimal effort will increase when rewards are framed as losses rather than gains.
We design incentives in the loss domain aimed at increasing student attachment to the reward, a primary mechanism of loss aversion (e.g., Ariely et al. 2005) . Students receive the reward before the incentivized test (and keep it during testing); they sign a form stating that the reward is theirs and that they are responsible for it; and they describe what they will do with the reward if their performance allows them to keep it. While similar framing mechanisms have been widely explored in the lab, ours is among the first studies to experimentally test loss aversion in the field.
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A more recent branch of behavioral economics has explored the effectiveness of nonfinancial rewards (e.g., Frey 2007 , Bradler et al. 2012 , Ashraf et al. 2012 . Such rewards derive their motivational power from a variety of mechanisms including status, self-image concerns and relative performance feedback that have been shown to affect behavior.
9 These types of non-pecuniary benefits may be particularly potent in the context of recognition for performance in school (e.g., Azmatt and Ireberri 2010).
Thus, in contrast to the standard prediction, some students may be willing to exert more effort for a trophy worth $3 than they are for $3 in cash. Non-pecuniary incentives are also attractive because they are already commonly used in schools, which tend to be more comfortable rewarding students with trophies, certificates and prizes than they are with using cash rewards. Despite their widespread prevalence, however, the effectiveness of non-
8 Previous field experiments have tested the effect of the loss frame in marketing messages on product demand (Ganzach and Karsahi 1995, Bertrand et al 2010) . In the context of incentives, as far as we know, Hossain and List (2009) is the only previous experimental study to test loss aversion in the field, finding that framing bonuses as losses improves the productivity of teams in a Chinese factory. In studies run concurrently to ours, Fryer et al. (2012) find that framing bonuses as losses improves teacher performance while List and Savikhin (2012) find no framing effects for student incentives to make healthy food choices. Krawczyk (2011) tests the effect of framing on risk taking on a final exam and finds no effect -the study does not examine the effect of framing on effort or overall performance. financial incentives is largely untested -particularly in terms of cost-effectiveness relative to monetary rewards.
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Finally, we address the role of timing of rewards. As we discussed above, students may have time preferences that lead to planning failures and underinvestment of effort in human capital. Most previous programs that have awarded incentives based on test performance have announced the incentive well in advance of the test using high school exit and achievement exams in Israel (Angrist and Lavy 2009) and Texas (Jackson 2010); and standardized tests for elementary/middle school students in Kenya (Kremer et al. 2009 ), India (Berry 2011) , Ohio (Bettinger 2010) and New York City (Fryer 2011 ). In the settings most similar to ours, Bettinger (2010) finds that incentives of up to $20 have a significant impact on third through sixth graders' performance in math but no impact on reading, social science or science; and, Fryer (2011) finds no effect on math or reading test scores of offering incentives of up to $30 to fourth graders and $60 to seventh graders.
Studies that have announced incentives immediately before the test have typically distributed rewards with a delay. The evidence on such delayed rewards is mixed. O'Neil et al. (1996 O'Neil et al. ( , 2004 find that delayed financial incentives can increase eighth grade test scores but have no effect on twelfth grade test scores, even at very high levels (up to $100 on a 10 question test).
11 In a similar design, Baumert and Demmrich (2001) find no effects of financial incentives on ninth grade test scores. These studies also find no treatment effects from non-financial incentives including feedback, ranking, goal setting, achievement certificates, and test scores counting towards classroom grades.
In our experiments, we announce the rewards immediately before the incentivized test (with no advance notice) and in non-delayed treatments distribute rewards immediately after 10 See for example Kohn (1999) for a review of the use of non-financial incentives. As we discuss below, O'Neil et al (1996) and Baumert and Demmrich (2001) test both financial and non-financial incentives for test performance.
11 O'Neil et al. (2004) also offered an immediate incentive of up to $20 based on answering 2 practice questions correctly. However, all participants in both the incentive and control groups answered the questions correctly, precluding any measurement of a treatment effect.
the test.
12 This ensures that students are choosing one-time effort in the immediate period only -i.e., there is no delay between investment decision-making, effort exertion and receipt of rewards. This feature allows us to ignore time discounting of effort, opportunity costs and planning failures as well as human capital gains that may accrue from effort in previous periods (e.g., studying for the test). We can therefore isolate the extent to which student effort is responsive to incentives.
Within this structure, we vary both the size and timing of the incentives. Varying the size of the reward allows us to distinguish whether students are unable to respond to incentives (because they have a limited understanding of the production function) or whether they are unwilling to respond to incentives (because effort costs are high relative to the size of the reward). We also compare the effects of immediate rewards to the effects of delayed rewards (distributed one month after the test). This allows us isolate the extent to which discounting affects students' effort investment decisions.
Experimental Design
The field experiment was carried out in five waves in three low-performing school districts in and around Chicago: Bloom Township (Bloom), Chicago Heights (CH) and Chicago Public Schools (CPS). The field experiment took place during regularly scheduled sessions of standardized diagnostic tests. These are low-stakes tests that students do not generally prepare for or have any external reason to do well on. Students take the tests three times a year in the fall, winter, and spring. 14 They are computer-based and last between 15-60 minutes with students' results available immediately after the test ends.
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In each session, immediately before testing began, the test administrator announced the incentive and told students that they would receive the reward immediately (or a month) after the test ended if they improved upon their score from a prior testing session.
16 Immediately after the test ended, we handed out rewards to qualifying students, except in the case of delayed rewards which were distributed a month after testing. 17 Students received no advance notice of the incentives prior to the testing sessions.
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Incentivized students were offered one of the following rewards: financial low ($10 cash), financial high ($20 cash) or non-financial (trophy). In the loss condition (financial high and non-financial) students received the reward at the start of the testing session and were informed that they would keep the reward if they improved (and that they would lose the reward if they did not improve). Students also filled in a sheet confirming receipt of the reward (and in CPS indicated on the form what they planned do with it) and kept the reward at their computer during testing. In the control groups, the test administrator either did not make any announcement (control -no statement) or encouraged students to improve on the test but did not offer any incentive to do so (control -statement In Bloom (Table 2a) there are no signficant differences between the control and individual incentive groups. There is however some imbalance in the overall distribution of black students and students eligible for free or reduced price lunch. In Chicago Heights (Table 2b) the only individually significant differences are the proportion of black and Hispanic students in the non-financial treatment. There is also overall imbalance in baseline test scores and the distribution of Hispanic students across treatments. Finally, in CPS (Table 2c ) the various treatment groups are balanced on average grade and baseline score (the immediate rewards non-financial incentive group has higher baseline scores than control significant at the p < 0.1 level). There are individually statistically significant differences (both positive and negative) in the proportion of math tests, as well as demographic measures in some groups. The only overall imbalance is in the proportion female across treatments. As shown below, the results are robust to including controls for baseline performance and other pretreatment characteristics.
23 Baseline test score is a standardized pre-treatment test score. In Bloom 2009, fall 2008 serves as the baseline. In Bloom 2010, fall 2009 serves as the baseline. In Chicago Heights, winter 2010 serves as the baseline. In CPS, spring 2010 serves as the baseline. Eligibility for free/reduced lunch is a proxy for family income. Individualized Education Plans (IEPs) provide additional services to struggling students. IEP status was not available for Bloom students. Table 3 reports our basic results, pooling across grades, subjects, and schools, for all of our treatments in which the rewards were delivered immediately (as opposed to with a one month delay). 24 The dependent variable in all regressions is test score improvement (in standard deviation units) with standard errors clustered by class (Bloom) or school-grade (CH and CPS).
25 Column (1) presents treatment effect estimates absent any controls except for the session of the experiment. The second column adds controls for baseline score in the tested subject, past treatment (whether the student was incentivized in a previous session), test subject, school and grade (for Chicago Heights and CPS students), teacher fixed effects (for Bloom students), and demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, free/reduced lunch eligibility, and (in Chicago Heights and CPS) IEP status). The omitted category in every regression is the pooled control (statement and no statement) group. There are no significant differences in performance between the control subgroups and pooling does not affect the results. This suggests that the treatment effects are due to the incentives rather than the presence of the experimenters or the mere encouragement to improve.
Result 1: Large and immediate monetary incentives lead to test score improvements, small monetary incentives do not
The first result that emerges from Table 3 is the power of large and immediate financial incentives to increase test scores. The point estimates of the $20 incentives (framed either as gains or losses) are consistently positive and statistically significant at conventional levels, with improvements ranging from 0.103−0.132 standard deviations. The large effects of these relatively modest financial incentives suggest that at baseline this population of students puts 24 An analysis of the individual waves, sessions (i.e., without pooling), and settings yields similar results. 25 Improvement is measured as the difference between the standardized outcome score and the standardized score students were told to improve upon. Scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation equal to 1. In Bloom, we standardize scores within each testing period using the full sample of Bloom students. In Chicago Heights, we standardize scores within each grade using the full sample of Illinois students. In CPS, we standardize scores within each grade, subject and testing period using the full population of CPS students.
forth low effort in response to low (perceived) returns to achievement on standardized tests.
The magnitude of the impact is equivalent to about 5 months' worth of learning on the test.
26 In contrast, however, we see no little or no impact from the $10 incentives. As far as we know, ours is the first study to demonstrate that student responsiveness to incentives is sensitive to the size of the reward. One interpretation is that, at least for some students, effort costs may be relatively high. 27 Together these results provide evidence that students understand the production function for this task but require sufficient motivation to exert effort.
Result 2: Non-financial incentives also impact performance
Turning to our first behavioral intervention, we compare the effects of non-pecuniary rewards to the effects of both low and high monetary rewards, which allows us to price out the effects of non-financial incentives. The point estimates for non-pecuniary rewards (framed either as gains or losses) are only slightly smaller than those for the $20 treatment and much larger than those from the $10 treatment. Typically, the material cost of non-financial incentives is low -in our case, one trophy cost approximately $3. Hence, non-financial incentives are a potentially much more cost effective way of improving student performance than is paying cash. As we discussed above, non-pecuniary incentives are also attractive because schools tend to be more comfortable rewarding students with trophies, certificates and prizes than they are with using cash incentives.
Result 3: Incentives framed as gains and losses have a similar impact
Our second behavioral intervention built on the large literature demonstrating the power of framing for influencing choices, especially in the gain/loss space. The bottom two rows 26 The month equivalent measure is based on the STAR Reading Assessment Instructional Reading Level. The Instructional Reading Level (IRL) is the grade level at which a student is at least 80% proficient. An IRL score of 6.6 (the average fall baseline score for Bloom 10th graders) indicates that a student is reading at the equivalent of 6th grade and 6 months (with 9 months in a school year).
27 It may also be the case that relatively low financial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation yielding smaller net effects. We address this concern below. of Table 2 report the estimates for our "loss" treatments: one using a financial incentive, the other a prize. The coefficients are slightly larger than those from the analogous "gain" treatments in the top two rows, but are not statistically different. Given that incentives framed as losses do not induce greater test score gains in this context, the more standard gain frame is probably preferable from a policy perspective. Schools tend to be more comfortable offering students rewards rather than threatening to take them away -in part because, as the researchers witnessed, students often express distress at having to return their rewards.
Result 4: Rewards provided with a delay have no impact on student performance
Perhaps the most striking and important finding of our study is that delayed rewards proved completely ineffective in raising test scores, as shown in Table 4 . The structure of the table matches that of table 3, except that the coefficients reported correspond to treatments in which the rewards were given to the students only after a one month delay.
28 In stark contrast to virtually all of the rewards bestowed immediately after the test, all but one of the coefficients on the delayed reward treatments are negative, although none of the estimates is statistically different than zero, in part because of large standard errors. It is the case, however, that the effects of the pooled delayed treatments are jointly significantly different from the analogous pooled immediate treatments at the p < 0.01 level. The divergence between the immediate and delayed rewards reflect either enormously high exponential discount rates (i.e. over 800 percent annually) or hyperbolic discounting.
While these findings are consistent with previous research highlighting the high discount rates of children, it poses a challenge for educators and policymakers. Typically, the results of the state-wide assessments are only available 1-2 months after the administration of the tests. More broadly, if similar discount rates carry over to other parts of the education production function, our results suggest that the current set of incentives may be leading to underinvestment in human capital.
Result 5: Younger students respond more to incentives, especially non-financial incentives
To investigate heterogeneous treatment effects, The first result to emerge is that younger students are more responsive to incentives with large positive impacts in all treatments. In contrast, only the financial loss incentive yields significant positive effects among older students. Second, younger children are less incentive sensitive. In middle and high school grades the impact of the $10 and $20 incentives are significantly different with the low financial incentive actually decreasing performance. Unlike older students, elementary students do not respond differentially to low and high financial rewards. They are also particularly responsive to non-financial incentives, improving by about 0.2 standard deviations (an effect size twice as large as treatment estimates in the full sample).
These results are sensible from a number of perspectives: younger children are less familiar with cash, might receive higher utility from the type of prize we were offering, and are also more likely to overestimate the value of non-financial rewards (for example, one third grader announced her estimated the value of the $3 trophy to be $20). Together our findings suggest that among children with a limited understanding of monetary returns, non-financial rewards can be particularly effective at addressing underinvestment in education.
Result 6: Math scores respond much more strongly than reading scores to our incentives
The fifth and sixth columns of tests respectively. The gains in math are very large ranging from roughly 0.1 − 0.3 standard deviations. The math point estimates are all positive and mostly significant. With the notable exception of the low financial incentives treatment, the reading coefficients are also positive. In every case, however, the positive impact is smaller for reading than for math and these differences are significant in the financial incentive treatments. The most likely explanation for this result is that math scores are more sensitive to effort than reading. And, indeed, it is often the case that educational incentives have a greater impact on math than reading (e.g., Decker et al. 2004 , Rockoff 2004 , Jacob 2005 , Dobbie and Fryer 2011 ).
Result 7: Suggestive evidence that boys are more responsive to our incentives than girls
The final columns of Table 5 present results separately for boys and girls. Across the board, we see larger responses to our interventions for boys relative to girls. The biggest gaps emerge with low financial stakes and in the non-financial treatments. However, this difference is only statistically significant at the 10% level for the low financial incentive. Our findings with respect to gender are consistent with a wealth of prior research that shows boys tend to be more sensitive to short-term incentives than girls, which may be due in part to gender differences in time preferences.
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Result 8: The introduction of rewards does not crowd-out future effort
The use of financial incentives in the education context has been sharply criticized. Theoretically, the most compelling of these criticisms is that extrinsic rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation, rendering such approaches ineffective in the short run, and potentially detrimental in the long run if intrinsic motivation remains low after the monetary incentives have been removed.
32 However, on tasks where intrinsic motivation is already low or zero, external 31 Evidence on the effect of incentives by gender is mixed with longer term studies tending to find larger effects on girls (e.g. Angrist et al. 2009, Angrist and Lavy 2009) and shorter term studies finding larger effects among boys, particularly in the context of competition Rustichini 2003, 2004) . Bettinger and Slonim (2007) and Castillo et al. (2011) find that boys are more impatient than girls.
32 While this argument applies to extrinsic rewards in any form, monetary incentives are considered particularly insidious to intrinsic motivation. rewards are less likely to have such negative long-term effects.
33 It is also worth noting that several studies have tracked student performance after incentives are removed and generally find that students who received incentives continue to outperform the control group (see, e.g., Bettinger and Slonim 2007 , Barrera-Osorio et al. 2008 , Kremer et al. 2009 , Levitt et al. 2010 ).
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We similarly explore whether the incentives have a detrimental impact on subsequent test performance. The richness of our design also permits us to learn whether spillovers differ between financial and non-financial incentives. Columns (3) and (4) report the impact of exposure to treatment today on test scores in the same subject, but when taking the exam in the next testing period, months later. 35 In neither case do we find strong evidence of either positive or negative spillovers from our incentive treatments. Roughly half the point estimates are positive and half negative, with only a few of the coefficients statistically significant. There is some evidence suggesting that low financial incentives might have negative spillovers, as in Rustichini (2000a, 2000b) . 36 There is similarly weak, but suggestive, evidence that the non-financial loss treatment generated positive spillovers on performance.
33 For further discussion see reviews by e.g., Eisenberger and Cameron 1996 , Camerer and Hogarth 1999 , Deci et al. 1999 , Kohn 1999 , Cameron and Pierce 2002 . Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997 present a formal model and evidence from a field study of motivation crowding-out in an economic context. 34 Additionally, Bettinger and Slonim (2007) find no evidence that a test performance incentive program erodes elementary school students' intrinsic motivation measured using student and teacher surveys.
35 In columns (1) and (2), we regress math (reading) treatment on reading (math) improvement in the same period (fall 2010 or winter 2011 in CPS, spring 2010 in CH) for students who received treatment on their first subject test. In columns (3) and (4), we regress the student's treatment on her improvement on a standardized test taken in the subsequent period, controlling for any subsequent treatments when necessary (winter or spring 2011 in CPS, spring 2009 in Bloom). Improvement in CPS spring 2011 was measured with respect to winter 2011.
36 There is also suggestive evidence that the $10 incentive can have a negative impact on the incentivized test itself, with negative estimated effects in several subgroups including older students, girls and reading tests (Table 5) .
Conclusion
This study examines potential sources of underinvestment in education using various incentive schemes inspired by recent findings within behavioral economics. We explore the shortterm effects of incentives on student effort and performance, varying the size and type of the rewards as well as their framing. We also offer rewards both immediately and with a delay.
We find considerable promise for adding behavioral insights to the educational policymakers' toolkit. Most importantly, seeking immediacy of rewards is fundamental in the presence of the hyperbolic discounting we observe, since most rewards from educational investment come only with great delay. This can potentially lead to dramatic under-investment. The low stakes tests we study are similar to the kinds of tasks students must engage in daily in order to accumulate human capital where without near term incentives baseline effort among many students is likely to be low.
While there is concern that incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation, extrinsic rewards can also be used to foster intrinsic motivation and habit formation (Lepper et al 1973 , Cameron et al 2005 , Bettinger 2010 ). In affluent families parents often provide children with these kinds of near term rewards including positive feedback, praise, and explicit incentives. Low-income parents in contrast are less likely to offer their children incentives for effort and achievement (Gottfried et al 1998) , which may contribute to teachers' struggles to maintain student motivation and focus in low-income schools. If immediate rewards increase students' estimated utility returns to education, then properly structured extrinsic rewards could potentially build (rather than crowd out) intrinsic motivation.
Such short-term rewards can also address problems related to planning failures and limited understanding of the production function. Students may not know the steps to take in order improve their achievement on a test that is six months away. However, they may be able to effectively respond to performance-based incentives on interim tasks such as learning the daily lesson, completing homework or focusing on a practice test.
Continuing to apply important elements of behavioral economics to issues within edu-cation can directly aid practitioners in need of fresh solutions to the urban school problem.
Such behavioral insights can strengthen the impact and the cost-effectiveness of interventions in education. They can also be used as a stepping stone for empiricists and experimentalists alike, who with the rich array of naturally-occurring data and experimental opportunities are in a unique position to examine theories heretofore untestable. Clearly, however, theory and empirical work must work symbiotically -there have been fewer theoretical advances that combine the best aspects of behavioral insights with issues germane to education. In this spirit, we hope that our study stimulates new work combining psychology and economics that not only deepens our understanding of empirical issues related to education, but also deepens our understanding of the important theoretical questions facing the field.
Gottfried, Adele Eskeles, James S. Fleming, and Allen W. Gottfried. 1998. "Role of Cog a Control and Financial Low ($10) are each pooled with treatments that add a statement that a student's improvement will be compared to three other students with similar past scores (see Appendix A for scripts). The comparison statement did not significantly affect test performance at the 10% level. b Control -Statement is pooled with Control -Statement -Delayed which states that students will learn their scores instead of (see Appendix A for scripts). The delayed statement did not significantly affect test performance at the 10% level. Baseline score is standardized within testing period to have mean zero and standard deviation one using the full sample of Bloom students. The joint F-test measures the probability that the means are equal to one another, clustering by class. Asterisks indicate a difference of means (compared to control with standard errors clustered by class) significant at the 10/5/1 percent level. Baseline score is standardized within grade to have mean zero and standard deviation one using the full sample of Illinois students. The joint F-test measures the probability that the means are equal to one another, clustering by school-grade. Asterisks indicate a difference of means (compared to control with standard errors clustered by school-grade) significant at the 10/5/1 percent level. Baseline score is standardized within grade, subject and testing period to have mean zero and standard deviation one using the full sample of CPS students. The joint F-test measures the probability that the means are equal to one another, clustering by school-grade. Asterisks indicate a difference of means (compared to control with standard errors clustered by school-grade) significant at the 10/5/1 percent level. Note: The table reports OLS estimates for treatment effects on test score improvement in standard deviation units for the CPS 2010 wave. Robust standard errors clustered by school-grade are reported in parentheses. The omitted category is the pooled control group. Column (1) controls for immediate incentive treatments (financial, non-financial, financial loss and non-financial loss). Column (2) adds controls for standardized baseline score on the tested subject (score, score squared and score cubed), school, grade, test subject and demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, free/reduced lunch status and IEP status). Asterisks indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. (4), (7) and (10) report p-values resulting from a test of equal coefficients between age, test subject and gender groups, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by class in Bloom and by school-grade in Chicago Heights and CPS are reported in parentheses. The omitted category is the pooled control group. All regressions control for session, standardized baseline score on the tested subject (score, score squared and score cubed), past treatment, school, grade, teacher, test subject and demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, free/reduced lunch status and IEP status), where applicable. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 
A.2 Chicago Heights
Common to all treatments To the teacher:
Please read the following statement to your students immediately before they begin the STAR test (after you have given them your regular instructions for testing):
Control -Statement
You are about to take the ThinkLink Learning test. You also took ThinkLink in the winter.
Please try to improve your score from the winter.
Control -Statement -Comparison
Please try to improve your score from the winter. We will compare your improvement to 3 other students who had the same score as you in the winter.
Financial Low ($10)
Please try to improve your score from the winter. If you improve your score from the winter, you will receive $10. You will be paid in cash immediately after the test.
Financial Low ($10) -Comparison
Please try to improve your score from the winter. We will compare your improvement to 3
other students who had the same score as you in the winter. If you improve your score from the winter, you will receive $10. You will be paid in cash immediately after the test.
Financial High ($20)
Please try to improve your score from the winter. If you improve your score from the winter, you will receive $20. You will be paid in cash immediately after the test.
Non-Financial (Trophy)
Please try to improve your score from the winter. If you improve your score from the winter, you will receive this trophy and we will post a photo like this of you in the class [show sample photo]. You will receive the trophy and be photographed immediately after the test.
A.3 Chicago Public School
Common to all treatments
To the teacher:
Please read the following statement to your students immediately before they begin the Scantron test (after you have given them your regular instructions for testing):
Control -Statement
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try to improve your score from the spring. You will learn your score immediately after the test.
Control -Statement -Delayed
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try to improve your score from the spring. You will learn your score one month after the test.
Financial Low ($10)
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will receive $10. You will learn your score and be paid in cash immediately after the test.
Financial High ($20)
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will receive $20. You will learn your score and be paid in cash immediately after the test.
Financial High ($20) -Delayed
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will receive $20. You will learn your score and be paid in cash one month after the test.
Financial Loss ($20)
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will get to keep your $20. If you do not improve your score from the spring, you will have to return your $20. You will learn your score and whether you get to keep your $20 one month after the test.
Non-Financial (Trophy)
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will receive this trophy [SHOW SAMPLE TROPHY ]. You will learn your score and receive the trophy immediately after the test.
Non-Financial (Trophy) -Delayed
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try to improve your score from the spring. If you improve your score from the spring, you will receive this trophy [SHOW SAMPLE TROPHY ]. You will learn your score and receive the trophy one month after the test.
Non-Financial Loss (Trophy)
You are about to take the Scantron test. You also took Scantron in the spring. Please try to improve your score from the spring.
You are being given a trophy. Please sign the form that says that this is your trophy. And write down what you will do with your trophy. [Wait for students to complete the confirmation form.]
If you improve your score from the spring, you will get to keep the trophy [SHOW SAMPLE TROPHY ]. If you do not improve your score from the spring, you will have to return your trophy. You will learn your score and whether you get to keep your trophy immediately after the test.
Non-Financial Loss (Trophy) -Delayed
You are being given a trophy. Please sign the form that says that this is your trophy.
And write down what you will do with your trophy. [Wait for students to complete the confirmation form.]
If you improve your score from the spring, you will get to keep the trophy [SHOW SAMPLE TROPHY ]. If you do not improve your score from the spring, you will have to return your trophy. You will learn your score and whether you get to keep your trophy one month after the test.
